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Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776

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(endurance in the community, commitment to long-term resolution) and weaknesses (lack of hierarchy, multiplicity of programs and doctrines, etc.).

In Part Four, "Training," Eileen Babbitt, an international politics professor, illuminates the topic of "Contributions of Training to International Conflict Resolution," describing training appropriate to specific conflicts and also the more general training of entry and midgrade foreign affairs professionals.

Peacemaking in International Conflict is not about international relations or the military's post–Cold War role. Rather, it concentrates on resolution of conflict by means other than force. Though couched in state-based terminology, it ignores the state itself as a political actor. One strength of this work is that it goes beyond state and national interests to focus on the socially confined arena where violent conflicts find their solutions. By explaining international relations theory; shortcomings in conflict resolution theory; subtleties in negotiation, adjudication, and mediation; and the part that religion plays, this book contributes to a richness of understanding in a complex world. Another strength of this work lies in its exposition of the character of many nonstate actors. Religious organizations and secular NGOs have assumed larger roles. The salience of diplomacy, tied to the sovereign state, continues to recede. This book helps the reader to understand why.

The major weakness of this book is the absence of the military. At this late date, its exclusion cannot be understood. Military organizations are routinely employed in the implementation of cease-fires, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the assurance of confidence-building measures. Local commanders often find themselves involved in immediate and highly dangerous conflict resolution. A chapter by an experienced military source would have been welcome.

Nonetheless, this book is a valuable addition to the library of those whose careers will expose them to the conflict resolution process. Zartman is incorrect to refer to his latest volume as a "tool kit." Rather, it provides a rough map and a compass, and it indicates where additional maps may be found.

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McDougal, Walter A. *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776.* New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997. 286pp. $26

Walter A. McDougal's *Promised Land, Crusader State* is a necessity for those with an interest in foreign policy and America's future. A Pulitzer Prize–winning author and editor of *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, McDougal here provides a survey based on his extensive historical studies of American diplomatic history. More importantly, he presents an original view of America as first a promised land and then a crusader state.

Rejecting the "sterile debate" over foreign policy doctrines following the post–Cold War era, and annoyed by the "flip" use of such terms as Wilsonianism and isolationism, McDougal

develops an alternative analytical structure built around a biblical analogy. Just as the Bible has an Old Testament and a New Testament, so too does American foreign policy, each covering about a century and divided into four "books" that are focused on a foreign policy tradition. In the foreign policy "old testament," these books are liberty, unilateralism, the American system of states, and expansionism.

McDougal begins his study with the realization by the first generation of American leadership that American liberty was being made meaningless by the interference of foreign powers. As the weaker nation encountering foreign colonial powers in North America in its expansion across the continent, it saw the need for freedom of action. McDougal postulates that the old testament books flow logically one into the next—liberty at home, unilateral action abroad, an American system of states for the Americas, and territorial and commercial expansion—all reinforcing each other and serving the interests of an agricultural nation. It was a realistic view of America's place in the world.

The "new testament" of the twentieth century includes progressive imperialism, Wilsonianism, containment, and meliorism. The end of the nineteenth century ushered in a transitional period: as America reached parity with other powers across both oceans, it had an opportunity and a need to alter its conduct. The social progressivism seen at home in the early twentieth century merged with a desire to transmit those policy goals into U.S. relations with others. McDougal sees progressive imperialism as consistent with expansionism beyond our shores to preserve freedom of action; first with Wilsonianism and then with global meliorism during the Vietnam era, America sought goals beyond balances of power, through democratic institutions, Third World development, and human rights. Containment was consistent with an understanding of the balances of power, but McDougal clearly is uncomfortable with the willingness of some to fashion national security goals in terms of melioristic interests.

He forcefully argues that while all of the traditions purported to serve liberty, Wilsonianism and global meliorism sought to expand that purpose beyond America's shores, to serve others' interests in liberty rather than our own. He sees the "old testament" traditions as acknowledging and working within a balance-of-power system and argues that in the end, liberty for America requires a balance of power in the world. As to the future, McDougal's hypothesis clearly implies that the United States must craft a foreign policy based on a realistic projection of that balance, in light of a solid definition of its interests, and should not subordinate these interests to an overarching global desire to improve world conditions.

Missing, though, is a strong recommendation as to where the United States should go in the future. McDougal makes a good argument for limiting the scope of his work, saying that there need be no overarching foreign policy like containment to follow in the post–Cold War world. Where the author shines is in providing a unique analytical framework, grounded in historical inquiry, through which one

may view America's place in the world. Also, his extensive bibliography is a wonderful resource. Not only an original analysis, *Promised Land, Crusader State* is fine historical writing.

As we reach the millennium, the debate over foreign policy rages on a wide range of issues, from Bosnia to Nato and NAFTA to China. McDougal provides a historical framework from which readers, rather than the author, must draw their own conclusions.

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Evans, G. Russell. *Death Knell of the Panama Canal?*. Fairfax, Va.: National Security Center, 1997. 237pp. $4.95 (paperback)

On 31 December 1999 the Panama Canal and all its installations are scheduled to revert to the Republic of Panama, in accordance with the 1977 treaty between the United States and Panama. This book, published by the National Security Center, was written by G. Russell Evans, a retired United States Coast Guard captain who is a student of the U.S.-Panama interplay on the canal. Evans argues for a treaty revision and a partnership of mutual benefit for both countries to take the place of what he calls the present "illegal" treaty. That the introduction was written by the greatly respected Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requires that Evans's arguments be heard and considered.

The book undeniably raises an alarm about a strategic issue of vital security to the United States—the canal's future. Unfortunately, the author's presentation of the events leading to the approval of the canal treaty and of its subsequent governmental examinations is offered in parochial, passionate, and inflammatory language that mars the often laudable critiques offered.

The canal's completion in 1914 was in the interest of every seagoing nation, providing easy passage between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The canal was also smack in the middle of every military logistician's calculations on strategy. There it has remained, although with the passage of time and the concurrent changes in military technology, estimates of the canal's utility to the United States and its vulnerability to terrorism have waxed and waned. Regrettably, these issues have been assessed in a cavalier and erroneous manner by many U.S. strategists, whose thinking has been befuddled by the issues of aircraft carriers too wide to make passage, the threat of long-range offensive missiles, and the possibility that locks could be disabled by explosives.

The reality is that the canal could be defended against missiles hy U.S. Army Patriot missiles or the impending Navy theater missile defense system. Surveillance techniques, now well practiced, could counter the transportable explosives threat. Regarding the canal's military utility, slim-hulled naval combatants now have great offensive lethality and accuracy in their missile systems, such as the Tomahawk missile. Meanwhile, the role of supporting military actions with beans, bullets, and oil is undiminished. Thus the book could be more effective if it offered a